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Abstract
Charitable giving in 2013 exceeded $300 billion, but why do we respond to some life-saving causes while ignoring others?
In our first two studies, we demonstrated that valuation of lives is associated with affective feelings (self-reported and
psychophysiological) and that a decline in compassion may begin with the second endangered life. In Study 3, this fading of
compassion was reversed by describing multiple lives in a more unitary fashion. Study 4 extended our findings to loss-frame
scenarios. Our capacity to feel sympathy for people in need appears limited, and this form of compassion fatigue can lead to
apathy and inaction, consistent with what is seen repeatedly in response to many large-scale human and environmental
catastrophes.
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Introduction
In a rational world, as threats to life increase in scale, potential
efforts to prevent harm should increase proportionally [1].
Decisions at organizational and political levels regarding the
allocation of resources for humanitarian aid are characterized by
how the need of others is perceived [2]. Public policy decisions
reflect public opinion on specific issues, and individual responses
towards humanitarian crises are likely informing and guiding these
decisions [3,4]. The main tenet of the present research is that
compassion and therefore societal concern often decrease rather
than increase in the face of greater threats. The primary aim of the
present article is to understand the psychological underpinnings of
this perverse phenomenon. More specifically, we propose and test
the hypothesis that the needs of others induce affective feelings,
and that donors often experience the strongest feelings for a single
identified person in need. As the number of needy persons
increases, affective feelings and action may begin to diminish.
Such ‘‘compassion fade’’ has implications for traditional theoret-
ical models of valuation and, more broadly, for the welfare of
society.
Traditional Models for Valuing Human Lives
How do we value the potential or actual loss of lives?
Egalitarian, normative models of life saving declare that every
human life should be valued equally, yet psychological descriptive
theories suggest that this is not the case [4]. For instance, prospect
theory [5], arguably the most important descriptive theoretical
framework in the field of decision making, proposes that the
carriers of value are positive or negative changes from a reference
point. The valuation function is nonlinear, reflecting diminishing
sensitivity to magnitude characteristic of many psychophysical
relationships. In the positive domain, for example, a gain of two
tends to be valued as less than twice that of a gain of one (Figure 1).
Referring to Figure 1, Kahneman [6] observed that ‘‘If prospect
theory had a flag, this image would be drawn on it’’ (p. 282).
Applications of the theory have focused on gains and losses of
money and human lives.
Consistent with the psychophysical function in prospect theory,
Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich [7] found that
the value of a life diminished against the backdrop of a larger
tragedy. For example, imagine that one person is at risk of dying
and that you could save her life by a donation to a trusted
humanitarian aid organization. Now imagine that 87 other
persons are at risk of dying, and that you could help save this
same person (now the 88th) by a similar donation to her. Would
you give the same amount in both scenarios? Even though in both
cases the recipient is the same person, donations likely will be
greater in the first scenario than in the second [1,8].
We propose the need to modify the value function in contexts
pertaining to the value of saving human lives as the number of
lives at stake increases. Although we do find evidence supporting
the monotonically increasing function with diminishing sensitivity
depicted in Figure 1, it may be that, in some contexts, a decrease
in valuation better describes how we react to greater needs.
Compassion Fade: A New Descriptive Model for Valuing
Lives
Affective feelings such as empathy, sympathy, sadness, and
compassion are often seen as essential for motivating helping
[9,10]. Emerging evidence from neuroscience research also
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supports the notion that affective feelings are integral to charitable
giving [11–13]. Slovic [1] suggests a model in which mental
images and attention are the precursors for affective feelings
toward others in distress. Consistent with this model, Dickert and
Slovic [14] demonstrated that sympathy towards a child in need
was greater when attention was focused directly on the child than
when judgments were made from memory. Distractor children in
the visual field also reduced sympathy toward the target child.
We propose that decisions about saving lives depend heavily on
affect. Affect, as defined here, is a feeling (not necessarily
conscious) that something is good or bad. Affective responses
occur rapidly and automatically. We, and others, have earlier
suggested that affect has several functions [15]. One of them is to
motivate behavior [16,17], including decision making [18,19].
Another is to add meaning to information [20]. Without affect,
information lacks meaning and will not be used in judgment and
decision making [21,22]. Affect plays a central role in dual-process
theories of thinking, which distinguish between experiential modes
of thought and deliberative modes (sometimes labeled System 1/
fast thinking and System 2//slow thinking, respectively; [6; for a
discussion about different dual processes models in decision
making see 23–25]). One of the characteristics of experiential
thinking is its affective basis. Although deliberation is certainly
important in many decision-making circumstances, reliance on
affect and emotion as sources of information tends to be a quicker,
easier, and more efficient way to navigate in a complex, uncertain
and sometimes dangerous world [6].
In his Nobel Prize Address, Kahneman notes that the operating
characteristics of System 1 are similar to those of human
perceptual processes [26]. He points out that one of the functions
of System 2 is to monitor the quality of the intuitive impressions
formed by System 1. Kahneman and Frederick [27] suggest that
this monitoring is typically rather lax and allows many intuitive
judgments to be expressed in behavior, including some that are
erroneous.
Importantly, System 1 appears to be limited in its capacity to
deal with quantities. System 1 tends to be an on-off system driven,
to a large extent, by images [2]. It is relatively insensitive to scope
[28,29]. For instance, Hsee and Rottenstreich [29] found that
donations to help one versus four pandas were not significantly
different when photos of the animals were shown to participants.
Given that we assign affect a primary role in motivating actions,
this dissociation between affect and abstract numbers is a problem
for how we value the saving of human lives.
Initial evidence for this comes from research showing that
compassion shown towards victims decreases as the number of
individuals in need of aid increases [30], identifiability of the
victims decreases [31], and the proportion of victims helped
declines [7]. Such fading of compassion has the potential to
significantly hamper individual-level and collective (e.g., political)
responses to pressing large-scale crises, such as genocide or mass
starvation [5] or severe environmental degradation [32].
Singularity Effects in Charitable Giving
In this article, we examine how affective feelings driven by
attention may underlie findings that, when it comes to eliciting
compassion, a single individual with a face and a name typically
evokes a stronger response than a group. Numerous studies have
demonstrated the identifiable victim effect, which is also quite evident
outside the laboratory. People are much more willing to aid one
identified individual than to help numerous unidentified or
statistical victims [33–35]. Why is this the case? Research by
Hamilton and Sherman [36] and Thompson, Hamilton, and Rust
[37] demonstrates that a single individual, unlike a group, is
viewed as a psychologically coherent unit. This leads to more
extensive processing of information and stronger impressions
about individuals than about groups. Consistent with this, Kogut
and Ritov [30] found that people tend to report feeling more
distress and compassion when considering a single identified
victim than when considering a group of victims, even if identified
(e.g., a singularity effect).
Specifically, Kogut and Ritov asked participants to contribute to
a costly life-saving treatment needed by a sick child or a group of
eight sick children. The target amount needed to save the child
(children) was the same in both conditions. All contributions were
actually donated to children in need of cancer treatment. In
addition, participants rated their feelings of distress (feeling
worried, upset, and sad) towards the sick child (children). The
sum of contributions to the single individuals far exceeded
contributions to the group even though the group was comprised
of some of these same individuals. Ratings of distress were also
higher in the individual condition. The authors concluded that the
greater donations to the single victim most likely stemmed from
the stronger affective feelings evoked by such victims.
Overview of the Present Studies
We use the term ‘‘compassion fade’’ to denote decreases in 1)
behavior, and 2) affect when the number of needy individuals
increase. ‘‘Compassion’’ is thus used to both capture the subjective
and behavioral components of this phenomena. The term
compassion is often used synonymously with terms such as
empathy, sympathy and empathic concern in the literature [9,38].
However, compassion and sympathy are typically other-oriented,
whereas empathy is denoting sharing of affective experiences [39].
Consistent with some previous research, we treat compassion as a
primarily positive valenced feeling state [40] that is outer-focused
and motivates prosocial action [41] through activation of
approach behaviors [42]. However, increases in the number of
needy individuals, as well as personalized perceptions of single
individuals, also increase personal distress and other negative self-
focused emotions [38,39,43] which could activate withdrawal
behaviors as well as approach behaviors [44]. In this study, we
characterize compassion fade as loss of positive affect and
diminished approach behaviors, consistent with recent theorizing
[41] and empirical results from both self-reports and brain
Figure 1. Prospect theory’s value function for gains and losses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100115.g001
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imaging [13]. We expect positive affect to be strongest for a single
identified individual. Further, positive affective is expected to
decrease as the number of needy individuals increase. This relative
decrease in positive affect is expected to (de-)motivate behavior (or
weaken approach behaviors). Thus, ‘‘compassion fade,’’ as used
here, denotes decreases in positive affect that lead to decreases in
donations, as the number of individuals in need increase.
In Studies 1–3, we examine the hypothesis that compassion fade
may begin as early as with the second endangered life. We
hypothesize that, as their numbers increase, less attention will be
directed towards those in need and less feeling of attachment [45]
and sympathy [30] will be experienced. As a consequence, we
expect lower levels of positive affect towards the children (as
indexed by self-reports [Studies 1a and 1b] and psychophysiolog-
ical measures [Study 2]) and smaller donations as the number of
children increases. In Study 3, we predict that positive affect and
donations to a group of children would be increased by
representing them as a single entity, rather than as multiple
individuals. Finally, in Study 4, we examine compassion fade in
the context of potential losses of life as opposed to life-saving
opportunities.
Ethics statement. Experiments were conducted in accor-
dance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964
Declaration of Helsinki. Studies were approved by the local ethics
committees where the data was collected (Va¨stra Go¨talands
regional ethics board, Studies 1–3, and IRB University of Oregon,
Study 4). Participants were compensated for their participation
and gave their informed consent prior to inclusion in the studies.
In all studies, participants received information about the study
prior to participating. After completing their task, participants
were thoroughly debriefed.
Studies 1a and 1b: Initial Demonstrations of Compassion
Fade
In Studies 1a and 1b, we conducted initial tests of compassion
fade by comparing ratings of self-reported affect and donations
(hypothetical and real) for either a single needy child or two needy
children (between-subjects design). Consistent with previous
research on the singularity effect [30] the children were identified
with a photograph, name, and age.
Based on the hypothesis that compassion fade may begin with
the second child, we predicted that self-reported affect and
donations would be higher for a single child than for two children.
Statistical tests (planned contrasts using independent t-tests)
comparing mean self-reported affect and donations between
conditions were conducted to test this hypothesis. In addition,
correlational and mediational analyses were conducted to examine
the role of affect in motivating donation behaviors.
Study 1a: Hypothetical Donations
Method. Two hundred and eight undergraduates in a
Swedish university (106 males) with a mean age of 26.8 (SD 6.4)
were presented with one of three scenarios. The two single-child
conditions included a description and picture of either a seven-
year-old girl, Rokia (n= 67) or a nine-year-old boy, Moussa
(n= 69). Participants were instructed that:
Any money that you donate will go to Rokia [Moussa].
Rokia [Moussa] is desperately poor, and faces a threat of
severe hunger or even starvation. Her [His] life will be
changed for the better as a result of your financial gift. With
your support, and the support of other caring sponsors, Save
the Children will work with Rokia’s [Moussa’s] family and
other members of the community to help feed her [him] and
provide her [him] with education, as well as basic medical
care and hygiene education.
In the two-children condition (n= 72), participants received a
similar description but with pictures and stories of both Rokia and
Moussa. Participants were instructed that their donations would go
to Rokia and Moussa. Prior to the task, participants received
information about the study and gave written consent to
participate.
Three measures were used: 1) Willingness to donate. Partici-
pants could circle any number between 0 and 70 Swedish crowns
(SEK) in 10-crown increments. 2) Affect. Feelings about donating
were rated on a scale ranging from slightly negative (–1) to positive (5).
3) Probability that the donation would make a real difference (1 to
5 scale anchored by not at all likely to very likely).
Results and discussion. Contrasts comparing donation
amounts showed that donations were significantly higher for the
single conditions (M= 37.7 SEK) than for the two-children
condition (M= 26.3 SEK), t(205) = 5.88, p,.001. Affect ratings
were more positive in the single conditions (M= 3.7, vs M= 3.3;
t(205) = 2.87, p,.01). The perceived probability of the donation
making a real difference was higher in the single-child conditions
(M= 4.4) than in the two-children conditions (M= 4.1);
t(205) = 4.50, p,.001. A mediation analysis [46] showed that the
effect of condition on donations was no longer significant (b = 0.09,
ns) when affect (b= 0.47, p,.05) was entered as a mediator, (F(4,
201) = 9.98, p,0.01; Sobel Z= 3.0, p,.05). However, additional
analyses showed that perceived probability did not mediate the
effect of condition on donations (Sobel Z ,1.0, p..05).
Study 1b: Real Donations
Participants and procedure. One hundred sixty-eight
undergraduates in a Swedish university (66 males) with a mean
age of 26.4 (SD 6.2) first completed an unrelated survey for which
they received 70 SEK (seven 10 SEK coins), a blank envelope, a
questionnaire, and a charity request letter. The experimenter
instructed participants to first read the charity request letter
carefully and place their donations (if any) in the envelope.
Participants then were asked to complete the questionnaire and to
return both the letter and questionnaire sealed in the envelope.
The letter informed participants of the opportunity to donate any
of their just-earned 70 SEK to the organization Save the Children.
Following the donation decision, participants rated their feelings
about donating to the child/children, ranging from slightly negative
(–1) to very positive (+5).
As in Study 1b, participants were presented with one of three
conditions. In the single-child conditions, they were given a
description and picture of either a seven-year-old girl, Rokia
(n= 47) or a nine-year-old boy, Moussa (n= 51). In the two-
children condition (n= 70), participants received a similar
description but with pictures and stories of both Rokia and
Moussa presented simultaneously on the same page. Participants
were instructed that their donations would go to Rokia and
Moussa.
Results and discussion. Planned contrasts showed that
donations (t(166) = 1.67, p,.05) and ratings of affect (t(166) = 2.81,
p,.01) were higher in the one-child (M = 24.5 SEK for donations,
and M = 3.5 for affect ratings) conditions than in the two-children
condition (M = 21.5 SEK for donations, and M = 3.0 for affect
ratings; see Figure 2A and B). A mediation analysis [20] showed
that the effect of condition on donations was no longer significant
(b= 0.16, ns) when affect (b= 0.35, p,.01) was entered as a
mediator, (F(4, 162) = 7.54, p,.001; Sobel Z= 2.1, p,.05). Studies
Affect and Donations
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1a and 1b thus showed that self-reported affective feelings and
donations to victims may start to decline as early as N= 2. Across
Studies 1a and 1b, self-reported positive affect and donations were
higher in the single-child conditions compared to the two-children
conditions. Further, the difference in positive affect, rather than
perceived probability that the donation would help, mediated the
effect of condition on donation amounts. Thus, Studies 1a and 1b
are consistent with affect as a main driver of compassion fade.
Study 2: Physiological Indicators of Compassion Fade
Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend the findings of Studies 1a
and 1b. Participants were asked to donate to either one, two, or
eight victims. Whereas affective feelings in Study 1 and in previous
research on the identifiable victim and singularity effects have
been measured using self-reports only, Study 2 incorporated
physiological measures of positive affect. Specifically, activity in
the facial Zygomaticus Major (ZM) was measured while partic-
ipants viewed children in need and decided whether to donate or
not. The ZM muscles are responsible for drawing back or
tightening the cheek in smiling. Activity of the ZM muscles has
been associated with self-reported pleasant emotions [47] and is
expected with reactions to the children (feelings of compassion) or
the anticipated warm glow of helping [48,49]. We hypothesized
that participants would experience stronger affect and donate
more for the single child. To examine this hypothesis, we
compared mean activity in ZM muscles (facial EMG) and
donation amounts between the single-child, two-children, and
eight-children conditions using within-subjects analysis of variance
(ANOVAs). Further, correlational and mediational analyses were
conducted to examine whether ZM muscle activity mediated the
effect of condition on donations.
Participants and methods. One hundred seven undergrad-
uates in a Swedish university (42 females) with a mean age of 29
years (SD= 4.4) completed the experiment.
A within-groups design was used whereby participants were
asked to donate money to one, two, or eight identified children.
The identified children were described with photographs, names,
and background information. A randomized-block design was
used such that participants saw eight separate presentations in
each block (one, two, or eight children per presentation) presented
sequentially (e.g., in the two-child block, participants were
presented with eight different presentations each depicting two
children). Within each block, the order of the stimuli was
randomized. A Latin-square design was used to counterbalance
the order between blocks. At the beginning of each block,
participants were endowed with 70 SEK and were told they would
be asked, at the end of the session, to donate money from this
allocation based on one of their donation responses, selected
randomly. The 70 SEK were given as seven 10 SEK coins and
participants were instructed to place the amount they desired to
donate for the selected trial in an envelope. Physiological measures
of ZM activity were obtained for each stimulus shown in a block.
In addition to ZM activity, measures of activity in the Corrugator
Supercilii (CS) were also collected. CS activity has been linked to
self-reported negative affect [47] and was included to obtain
physiological markers of both positive affect (ZM activity) and
negative affect (CS activity). However, based on Studies 1a and 1b
showing that positive affect declined as the number of children in
need increased, we primarily expected that ZM activity would
Figure 2. Real donations, self-report, and psychophysiological measures of affect for 1, 2, and 8 children. In Study 1, average donations
(in SEK) decreased with increasing number of victims (A) and positive affect was stronger for the single victim (B). In Study 2, donations decreased
with more victims (C) and positive affect (facial EMG measurement) decreased with an increasing number of victims (D). ZM activity for one child was
significantly greater than for two children (p,0.05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100115.g002
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differ between conditions. All physiological data were individually
z-scored across subjects and, within a block, mean activity across
the eight stimuli presented was used for final analysis.
Facial EMG recordings were first individually inspected for
possible artifacts and were band-pass filtered from 10 to 400 Hz
[47]. Change scores were calculated separately for each EMG
signal by subtracting the average response for each one-second
interval for the eight seconds following picture onset from the
mean activity during the one second preceding picture onset
(baseline). The average of the change scores from zero to eight
seconds following picture onset was used in the subsequent
analysis. There were order effects of presentation of the blocks
such that donations and affect were higher for early donations (first
or second presentation). However, no systematic interactions with
condition were found.
Results and discussion. As in Study 1, donations decreased
with an increasing number of victims (M1 child = 24.9; M2 children = 23.4,
M
8 children
= 21.3; linear trend analysis F(1,103) = 12.01, p,.001; see
Figure 2C). ZM activity (positive affect) was highest for one victim and
decreased linearly with increasing number of victims (M1 child = .41;
M2 children = .12, M8 children = .09, F(1,103) = 8.90, p,.001 (see
Figure 2D). CS activity (negative affect) slightly increased at eight
victims (M1 child = .58; M2 children = .47, M8 children = .89) but this linear
trend effect was not significant (F ,1). To further examine the
relationship between physiological indicators of affect and donations,
we correlated ZM activity and donation amount within each condition.
The correlation was strongest in the single-child condition (r= 0.44,
p,.001), followed by the two-children condition (r= 0.26, p,.01), and
the eight-children condition (r= 0.16, ns). A bootstrapped mediation
analysis [34] tested whether donations were mediated by positive affect.
It showed that the effect of condition on donations was no longer
significant (b= 0.09, ns) when ZM activity (b= 0.48, p,.01) was entered
as a mediator, Sobel z= 3.2, p,.001). An analysis with CS activity
showed no mediation (Sobel z ,1.0, p..05).
This is the first study to show that a physiological marker of
positive affect, EMG activity in ZM, can differentiate between the
number of children in need. This finding replicates and extends
previous research on the singularity effect [30] by showing that
positive affect decreases with increasing number of children in
need. Previous research suggested that affect plays a role in the
singularity effect, but did not establish how differently valenced
emotions influence behavior, and in which direction. Studies 1a,
1b, and 2 together provide evidence that a single child elicits
greater positive affect and donations. The loss of positive emotion
with an increasing number of children appears to be reducing
donations.
In Study 3 we examined whether describing many children as a
single group would reduce compassion fade and maintain
donations for the many at the level of the single individual.
Study 3: Reversing Compassion Fade Through Entitativity
Single, identified individuals receive more help than do a
collective of many needy individuals [1,2,30]. But can the
collective be individualized as a unitary entity–for example, a
family, a village, a school, or even a country–in a way that induces
the high level of support that goes to an individual person?
As noted above, Hamilton and Sherman’s work [36] on
entitativity suggests that individuals and groups are processed
differently. More specifically, perceivers attempt to form in-depth,
organized, and coherent impressions of individual targets while
groups are processed more superficially. Further, greater attention
to the individual relative to the group may tend to result in
stronger affective reactions to the individual.
A recent study by Smith, Faro, and Burson [50] manipulated
entitativity in a charitable giving context by comparing how
‘‘unitization’’ of unrelated individuals could increase donations.
They compared six unrelated children in need of aid to the same
six described as siblings and found that the latter elicited far
greater donations.
In Study 3 we aimed to replicate and extend this finding using a
version of our compassion-fade paradigm. If a unitization
manipulation would increase donations and positive affect for
the type of small groups of needy children we present here, this
would suggest that entitativity is central for compassion fade.
Further, if unitization manipulations are effective, this may be a
way to combat compassion fade.
In a between-subjects design, participants were asked to indicate
how much they would be willing to donate either to a single
victim, two unrelated victims, eight unrelated victims, a family of
two children, or a family of eight children. We compared mean
donations and self-reported affect between conditions using
ANOVAs and planned contrasts. We expected that the decline
in response observed in our previous studies would be reversed or
mitigated by the entitativity manipulations. More specifically, we
expected that mean donations and positive affect would be higher
in conditions where the children were portrayed as (related) group
(high entitativity) compared to when the same children were
described as unrelated individuals.
Method. Students in a Swedish university (N= 131, 82
females, mean age 24.5, SD 5.1) participated in the study. A
between-subjects design was used where participants were
randomly allocated to one of five conditions: 1) a single child, 2)
two unrelated children, 3) eight unrelated children, 4) two related
children, and 5) eight related children. In the single-child
condition, participants were given a photograph and a name
and instructed that: ‘‘you can help [name] with your donation.’’ In
the two-unrelated-children condition, participants were also given
photographs and names, but each child was depicted in a separate
picture. Participants were instructed that: ‘‘you can help [name]
and [name] with your donation.’’ A similar procedure was used for
the eight-unrelated-children condition. In the related-children
conditions, participants were shown the same children, all together
in the same photograph, and were instructed that ‘‘you can help
the family consisting of [name] and [name] and… with your
donation.’’ Participants were asked to indicate how much they
would be willing to contribute to the cause (a hypothetical
donation) followed (on a separate page) by ratings of perceived
need ‘‘How much does/do the child/ren need your help?’’ rated
on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) scale, as well as by ratings of
positive and negative affect (‘‘How positive/negative do you feel
about helping the child/ren?’’ on a 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much)
scale).
Results and discussion. Consistent with our previous
results, donations decreased linearly with an increasing number
of unrelated victims (Table 1; linear trend F(4,126) = 4.25, p,.01).
Similarly, positive affect decreased with an increasing number of
unrelated victims (F(4, 126) = 2.22, p,.05). More importantly,
both the critical contrasts between two unrelated/two related
children (t(54) = 1.88, p,.05) and eight unrelated/eight related
children (t(51) = 2.6, p,.05) were significant for donations. As can
be seen in Table 1, donations increased when the same number of
children were described as a coherent unit–a family. A main effect
of related versus unrelated condition on need ratings was observed
(F(4, 130) = 2.93, p,.05), but only the eight-children contrast was
significant (t(51) = 2.3, p,.05) with higher need ratings for the
related condition. Similarly, both positive (t(49) = 2.1, p,.05) and
negative affect (t(49) = 3.3, p,.01) were higher in the eight-related-
Affect and Donations
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children condition than in the eight-unrelated-children condition.
No other comparisons were significant.
Study 3 thus provided further support for the notion that a
single individual is processed differently than a group of
individuals. First, we replicated the finding that, as the number
of children increases, donations and positive affect decrease.
Second, by using entitativity manipulations whereby several
children were perceptually (appearing in the same photograph)
and psychologically (described as ‘‘a family’’) grouped into a single
unit, we were able to show that donations and affect were
comparable to that of a single individual. These findings support
the notion that compassion fade is an affective phenomenon where
feelings are greatest for single individuals, or groups perceived as
individual units. These findings not only extend our understanding
of the psychology underlying compassion fade, but also suggest
ways to combat loss of feeling as need increases. Thus far, we have
examined compassion fade in a positive frame–life saving. In
Study 4, we will examine whether compassion fade extends to
frames involving losses of life.
Study 4: Singularity Effect and Compassion Fade in Loss
Frames
The studies here, and in previous research, have shown that
people will go to great lengths to save a single identified victim
[1,29]. Much of the current research on identifiable victim effects
or singularity has been examined in the context of positive frames,
via providing aid through donations or charitable behavior. In
Study 4 we consider compassion fade in loss frames, in the context
of mitigating possible deaths. We hypothesize that it should also be
the case that people will be most averse to the death of a single
identified victim. Study 4 used hypothetical crisis scenarios to test
the sensitivity to potential losses of life.
Method. Students at the University of Oregon (N= 559)
completed a short survey for class credit. Although demographic
information was not collected, similar university samples have
consisted of approximately 60% females with a mean age of 19.5
(SD 2.2). Participants were asked to consider the following
scenario:
Imagine you are a member of a civil defense committee that
is considering contingency plans in the event of various
emergencies. One emergency under discussion is the
following:
A train carrying a very toxic chemical derails and the
storage tanks begin to leak. The threat of explosion and
lethal discharge of poisonous gas is imminent.
Two possible actions are being considered. Read them and
indicate your preference and opinion of each.
Option A: would contain the threat but carries a.5
probability of losing 60 lives and a.5 probability of losing
40 lives
Option B: would contain the threat but carries a.5
probability of losing 150 lives and a.5 probability of losing
0 lives [This option varied by condition.]
Which option do you prefer?
We used a between-subjects design in which subjects were
assigned one of the following four choices for option B (option A
remained the same for all conditions and always offered a smaller
expected loss of life than Option B).
Condition 1).5 probability of losing 150 lives and a.5 probability
of losing 0 lives.
Condition 2).5 probability of losing 150 lives and a.5 probability
of losing 1 life (John Davis, a chemical engineer that would play a
crucial but dangerous role in the cleanup).
Condition 3).5 probability of losing 150 lives and a.5 probability
of losing 2 lives (John Davis and Richard Carey, chemical
engineers that would play a crucial but dangerous role in the
cleanup).
Condition 4).5 probability of losing 150 lives and a.5 probability
of losing 3 lives (John Davis, Richard Carey, and Josh Burns,
chemical engineers that would play a crucial but dangerous role in
the cleanup).
Fictitious names and stock portraits were used to identify the
possible victims in option B. Participants chose either option A or
option B, rated their strength of preference for their chosen option,
and gave a brief explanation for their choice. Strength of
preference was given on a five-point scale, ranging from No
preference to Very strongly prefer. Option A remained the same for all
conditions and always offered a smaller expected loss of life than
Option B. After indicating their choice, participants gave a brief
reason for it.
Results and discussion. Figure 3 shows the percentage of
participants choosing Option A or Option B for each condition.
An omnibus effect of condition was found for the percentage of
choices (X2 (1, N= 559) = 8.03, p,.05). The percentage of people
choosing A or B was close to 50% in the zero-identified-victim
Condition 1. Based on the self-reported explanations of choice,
many respondents were enticed by the possibility of zero deaths,
despite the high risk of 150 deaths. Consistent with the singularity
effect, adding one identified victim to option B created a strong
shift in choices and preferences. Option B was chosen significantly
less often (X2 (1, N= 280) = 5.33, p,.05) and was considered
significantly less preferable (t(113) = 4.39, p,.001) in the single-
victim condition, compared to the zero-loss-of-life condition,
despite the fact that the difference in negative expected value was
negligible between the two options (–75.5 lives compared to –75).
Table 1. Mean WTC, Need, and Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) (Study 3).
Unrelated Related
Dependent One child Two children Eight children Two children Eight children
WTC 31.8 25.9 20.0 32.9 32.1
Need 3.0 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.8
PA 3.4 3.0 2.6 3.1 3.3
NA 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.7 3.2
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100115.t001
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Increasing the number of identified victims from 1 to 2 slightly
decreased the percentage of respondents who chose option B (34%
to 33%), but significantly increased strength of preference ratings
for option B (t(92) = –2.35, p,.05). Increasing the number of
identified victims from two to three increased the proportion of
times Option B was chosen (33% to 40%) and further increased
strength of preference ratings for option B, although these
differences did not reach statistical significance.
Preferences for options A and B were then recoded into a single
continuous scale (Option A: No preference= 0, Slightly prefer= –1,
Prefer = –2, Strongly prefer= –3, Very strongly prefer = –4; Option B: No
preference= 0, Slightly prefer= 1, Prefer= 2, Strongly prefer= 3, Very
strongly prefer= 4). A main effect of condition was found
(F(3,546) = 4.39, p,.01) as well as negative quadratic trend in
preference across conditions (F(1,546) = 6.41, p,.05). The nega-
tive quadratic trend complements the choice data, indicating a
large drop in preference for option B from zero identified victims
to one, but flattening (and slightly increasing) as the number of
identified victims increases.
These results mirror the donation findings, but in the context of
loss frames. Participants were much less likely to risk the death of a
single identified victim than when no identified victim was present,
even though the alternative posed the loss of at least 40 lives!
Participants were slightly more likely to risk the death of three
identified victims than one identified victim. The results are
consistent with both a psychophysical function for loss frames and
a possible decline or fading of compassion as the number of
identified victims at risk increased. Perhaps if the number of
identified victims continued to increase, the percentage of people
choosing to risk the identified victims’ lives might also increase and
eventually be identical to the zero-victim condition.
General Discussion and Conclusions
The results from four studies show that affective feelings
about charitable causes were strongest for a single endangered
person and began to decline as the number in danger grew
larger. In support of compassion fade, both self-report and
physiological measures of affect showed that positive affect
declined substantially when the group size was two or more.
This decrease in positive affect was related to lower donations.
A decrease in positive affect with increasing numbers at risk is
consistent with research in social psychology showing differential
processing of individuals and groups [36], research on decline in
object attachment when the number of objects increases
[37,45], and research on decline of attention and sympathy as
more people enter the visual field [14].
Previous studies [30] have demonstrated the singularity effect
showing that a single individual in need (compared to a larger
group) elicits more compassion and donations. Our first three
studies replicated and extended these findings by showing that the
singularity effect already begins to break down as we move from
one to two persons in need. This finding hints at a disturbing
psychological tendency. Our capacity to feel positive affect for
people in need may be limited. When lives are at stake, feelings
necessary to motivate lifesaving action may peak at N= 1 person.
Attention, feelings, and response may begin to decline or fade at
N= 2, eventually collapsing at some higher value of N that is
perceived as merely ‘‘a statistic.’’ (See Figure 4).
There are several ways to account for compassion fade. Our
results suggest that people begin to lose affective attachment as the
number in need increases. We argue that it may be natural and
relatively easy to empathize and feel compassion with a single
identified individual, but that it is difficult to ‘‘scale up’’ this
emotion when we need to consider more than one individual. In
fact, as the number in need increases, we may find it more difficult
to empathize, but at the same time feel more negative emotion.
Cameron and Payne [51] showed that as the number of lives in
need of help increases, people experience negative affect and
attempt to regulate these negative feelings by turning their
attention away from the problem. A similar prediction can be
derived from Batson’s empathic concern/personal distress frame-
work – as the number of individuals in need increase the more
personal distress is experienced [38]. Stronger egocentric motiva-
tions (i.e. desire to feel better) with increased personal distress may
lead to motivated affect regulation and decreased giving [52].
The findings in this paper are partly compatible with these
explanations for compassion fade. More specifically, we found in
both in Studies 1 and 2 that physiological and self-reported
measures of negative affect did not decrease but instead tended
to increase as the number of children in need increased.
However, negative affect was not predictive of donation
behavior in either study. Instead, and counter to what may
be expected from motivated down-regulation of negative affect,
we found that the single individual elicits positive affect that
decreases as the number of children in need increase. This
decrease in positive affect was predictive of reduced donations.
Motivated emotion regulation cannot easily account for this
finding. Instead, our data suggest that losses of attention and
positive emotion are critical mechanisms underlying compassion
fade. This finding also runs counter to a possibility raised by the
empathic concern/personal distress framework - that a single
Figure 3. Preferences shifted when identified victims were
presented in loss-of-life gambles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100115.g003
Figure 4. A model depicting psychic numbing–compassion
fade–when valuing the saving of lives.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100115.g004
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identified victim elicits the highest distress and therefore should
be associated with the lowest levels of giving [38]. Consistent
with our psychophysiological findings implicating loss of positive
affect, recent brain-imaging research has shown that identifia-
bility effects (giving more to single identified compared with
unidentified victims) are uniquely predicted by changes in
reward circuitry in the nucleus accumbens [13]). Our findings
suggest that valanced affect is a driver of compassion fade. It is
however possible that different distinct emotional states associ-
ated with different approach-avoidance motivations may over-
ride, attenuate, or amplify compassion fade [43,44]. Future
research should address this issue more closely.
The natural and easy way to deal with moral issues is to rely on
our intuitions. ‘‘How important is this person’s or this group’s need
for assistance? Well, how important does it feel?’’ We can also
apply reasoned deliberation to guide us but, as Haidt [53], Greene
[54], Sunstein [54] has demonstrated (see [55] for alternative
conceptualizations), moral intuition usually comes first and
dominates moral judgment unless we make an effort to critique
and, if necessary, override our intuitive affective feelings. Left to its
own devices, moral intuition will likely favor individual victims and
under-react to large-scale crises [1]. Our sizable capacity to care
for others may not be engaged unless we find ways to overcome
compassion fade. In Study 3, we showed that describing several
children as a single unit raised the level of donations and affect to
the level of the single individual (see also [50]). This approach may
therefore be fruitful in raising the level of help given to the many in
need.
Unfortunately, we are not always in a position of saving lives. In
many real-world situations, decisions must be made to mitigate
death [1]. For example, war strategists must make tactical
decisions in the face of collateral deaths of many innocent lives;
emergency response teams frequently encounter tragic situations
in which not all victims can be saved [2]. We must consider that
decision makers may be vulnerable to the same biases of
singularity in loss-of-life scenarios as found in life-saving scenarios.
Study 4 showed that, when choosing hypothetical contingency
plans to mitigate deaths, people are averse to an option that risks
the death of a single identified victim. When participants were
asked to explain their choice, one subject stated, ‘‘One specific
death made it seem all too real.’’ Similar to our donation study
findings, the loss of an identified victim creates an affect-rich
scenario. But those feelings are spread more and more thinly as the
number of victims increases.
There are, of course, examples of sizable contributions of aid
to the thousands of victims of a natural disaster that seem to
run counter to compassion fade. Examination of these events
show they differ in a number of ways from the life-saving cases
studied here. First, they represent acute events, with a relatively
clear time course, after which much of the aid is given to
enable recovery. Second, these acute catastrophes are accom-
panied by massive, comprehensive, and vivid media coverage,
including dramatic personal stories of identified victims [2].
Donors can understand the distress experienced by the victims
and empathize with them [3]. This differs greatly from the
scenarios studied here, involving typically invisible crises of
individuals afflicted with chronic conditions of poverty such as
hunger, malnutrition, and disease. Natural disasters play out
over a long enough period of time for slow thinking to
comprehend the seriousness of the suffering and devastation
they cause [3]. Our donors, in contrast, are given only a brief
moment to make their decisions. Finally, as large as the
donations seem to be (e.g., more than $4 billion after Hurricane
Katrina), they pale in comparison to the economic costs (more
than $250 billion for Katrina), not to mention the human costs.
As the ongoing emergency fades, efforts to prevent or mitigate
future disasters meet the same psychic numbness we document
here.
Implications for Theory and Applications
At a theoretical level, these results suggest that important
descriptive decision-making accounts such as prospect theory may
not always adequately describe how people value human lives
[4,5]. We propose that, for life-saving decisions, both the gain
(Studies 1–3) and loss domain (Study 4) of the value function may
not only be characterized by a decreased sensitivity as magnitude
increases (the psychophysical function in Figure 1), but may
sometimes even show a decline in value (Figure 5). Figure 5
hypothesizes a decreased sensitivity and at some point decreasing
value in both the loss and gain domains (an inverted U-shape in
the gain domain; U-shaped for losses) reflecting eventual loss of
value (following initial decrease in sensitivity).
There is considerable evidence outside the field of judgment
and decision making for a value function following such an
inverted U-shape function in the gain domain. While it is
difficult to find evidence of the negative utility of increases in
monetary wealth, other forms of basic economic behavior can
follow a declining function even to the point of collapse. For
example, food consumption often follows this trajectory where
the value of initial food intake is very high. After attaining some
level of satiation (a psychophysical function consistent with
prospect theory), further food intake may no longer be attractive
(i.e. the value is changing). Importantly, at some point (a
threshold that may vary with individuals and over time and
contexts) the value of further intake is going to start to decline
(i.e. a negative value), perhaps precipitously [55,58]. We believe
that such a model can describe how we value magnitudes more
generally in at least some domains, including valuation of lives.
While the diminishing sensitivity to magnitude in prospect
theory may be explained (at least in part) by diminishing
sensitivity to abstract numbers ([59], the further collapse in
domains such as valuation of lives may be determined by
decreased positive affect to those additional lives.
How can this tendency to underreact be overcome? Recent
research suggests that the singularity effect may be used to boost
giving. Hsee et al. [60] found that merely asking donors to indicate
a hypothetical amount for helping one needy person, before asking
donors to decide how much to donate for all of those in need,
increased donations for the group.
Figure 5. A modified value function.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100115.g005
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Ultimately, thoughtful deliberation, what Kahneman [6] calls
slow thinking, may be necessary to alert us to an undesired
disconnect between the high value we place on individual lives and
our neglect of populations at risk [30,61,62]. Perhaps this
deliberative perspective will impress upon us the need to create
institutional mechanisms that doggedly pursue the hard measures
needed to combat mass tragedies when our attention strays and
our numbed feelings lull us into complacency [3,63].
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